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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE CITY OF BLANDING, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
KIM FAI CHAN and 
SOOK WAH CHANf 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 870604-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the Trial Court err in failing to extend 
Constitutional protection to the material alleged to be 
pornographic. 
II. Did the Trial Court err in allowing the prosecuting 
attorney to testify with respect to material factual details 
relating to elements of the offense. 
III. Did the Trial Court err in finding Appellantsf Kim Fai 
Chan and Sook Wah Chanf guilty as a matter of fact and law of 
distributing pornography in violation of Blanding City Ordinance 
13-120413C. 
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IV. Is Blanding City Ordinance 13-120413 C 
unconstitutionally vague in its requirement of a "reasonable 
inspection or observation under the circumstances" in order to 
impute constructive knowledge of the contents of materials to the 
Appellants. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
There are no authorities which Appellant believes to be 
directly dispositive of any of the issues of the case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction on October 16, 
1987 wherein the Circuit Court found Defendants - Appellants 
guilty of distributing pornographic materials in violation of 
Blanding City Ordinance 13-120413 C. 
Course Of Proceedings Below 
Appellants were first tried and convicted of distribution of 
pornography in Justice Court in Blanding. (R.l-11) Appeal was 
taken to the Circuit Court in Monticello. (R. 17) 
Appellants, Kim Fai Chan and Sook Wah Chan, were charged in 
Circuit Court in one Count with renting the video taped movies 
"Has Anybody Seen My Pants" and "There Is No Sex Like Snow Sex" 
in Blanding, Utah to an adult on May 5, 1986; Appellant, Kim Fai 
Chan, was further charged with renting the video movie 
"Confessions Of A Young American Housewife" to an adult on June 
13, 1986. (R. 115) 
The case was tried to the bench, Honorable Bruce K. 
Halliday, Judge presiding, on October 15, and 16, 1987. On 
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October 16, 1987 the Court found Mrs. Chan guilty of the charge 
of distributing pornographic materials on May 5, 1986; and Mr. 
Chan guilty of distributing pornographic materials on June 13, 
1986, but not guilty of distributing pornography on May 5, 1986 
(R. 116). Each was sentenced to a $120 fine and seven days in 
jail (R 116). 
On or about October 23, 1987, Appellants moved for a new 
trial. (R. 106) 
The Trial Court denied Appellants1 Motion for a new trial 
December 15, 1987 (R. 139) and appeal to this Court was filed 
December 24, 1987. (R. 141) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Melvin Laws - Disgruntled Competitor 
The Appellants purchased a fast food restaurant in Blanding, 
Utah in September, 1985. (T. Melvin Laws P.14; P.27 L.21-25) 
The seller, Melvin Laws, Respondent city's first witness, was 
upset by the outcome. 
Q: Now, at first the business was going to be a 
restaurant; is that the way you understood it when 
you sold it to Mr. Chan? 
A: Correct. 
Q: You hadn't anticipated he was going to have a video 
business? 
A: Correct 
Q: And you were pretty upset when you found out there 
was going be another video business right next door 
to you; isn't that a fact? 
A: Correct. 
Q: Yea. And you had some problems with Mr. Chan; isn't 
that a fact? 
A: Correct. (T. P.28 L.11-24) 
Over Appellants' counsel's objections to the conclusory 
foundational and hearsay nature of the testimony sought, (T. 
P.15, 16, 17, 18), Mr. Laws testified, 
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The Court: I'm going to allow him to answer. 
The Witness: The question again. 
Q: (By Mr. Halls) Did you have inquiries... I don't 
know what the question was. Did you have any 
inquiries in your business... did anybody come to 
your business and ask for a particular type of 
movie? 
A: Yes, I had a number of people come in and say, "Do 
you have X-rated movies?" And I said "No." "We 
were told that you have them under the counter..." 
(T.P.18 L.9-17) 
Mr. Laws testified, again over objection, that he received movies 
back from customers belonging to the store of Appellants. 
According to Mr. Laws, these mixups were extremely common. when 
asked how many people asked him for these "X-rated" 
movies, his testimony was "several dozen". (T.22, L.l-4) 
Mr. Laws suffered a memory lapse as to who specifically requested 
these movies, but he clearly recalled "several dozens". (T. P.29 
L.6-14) 
Mr. Law's stated perception that his "reputation was being 
ruined by what people thought was going on out of my store, " 
moved him, he testified, to complain to the police. (T.21 P.1-4) 
Thereupon the police department of Blanding City launched a 
full scale investigation. A search warrant of Appellants' 
business was issued and a number of video tapes confiscated. (T 
39 L.20-23) None of these confiscated tapes became the subject 
of other prosecution, nor were they introduced at trial. (T.40 
L.4-7) 
B. Count I - May 5, 1985 
The basis of the prosecution from which this appeal is taken 
arises from the following scenario. On or about May 5, 1985, the 
testimony is undisputed that Mike Dayzie, working as an 
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undercover agent for Blanding City, went to Appellants1 business 
and rented two movies, Exhibit No."I", "Has Anybody Seen My 
Pants" and Exhibit No. " 11" , " Theref s No Sex Like Snow Sex". 
(Testimony Michael Dayzie, T. pps. 49, 50, 51) 
Both Mr. Dayzie and Appellant, Sook Wah Chan, testified that 
she had taken his identification and rented tapes to him on 
previous occasions, and that each was known to the other from 
prior transactions. (T. pps. 51, 52, 53; Testimony Sook Wah Chan, 
T. 112-114). It is undisputed that Mr. Dayzie requested "party 
movies" (T. 50 L.20-23), that Mrs. Chan inquired if Dayzie were 
21 because she "didn't want to get in trouble with the cops", 
that he responded in the affirmative, (T 51, L. 17-20) and that 
she thereupon produced Exhibits "I" and "II" from under a counter 
in the store, where they were not in public view (T. 51, L.l). 
Mr. Dayzie testified that he was in fact 23 years old (T 53, 
L.19-20). The Court will note upon inspection that Exhibits "I" 
and "II" are "non-rated", i.e., they bear no rating of any kind. 
The movies were not on display but were kept under the counter 
(Dayzie, T. 56, L.20 p.57 L.2). 
C. Count II - June 13, 1986 
The second allegation was evidenced in the following manner. 
Deputy Sheriff Michael Halliday testified that upon receiving a 
complaint from another person that Appellants were making 
available a movie the other person had seen in another place and 
where it was rated "X". So at some point in time, which the 
record fails to disclose, Mr. Halliday, rented the video tape 
which is Exhibit "III", "Confessions of a Young American 
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Housewife". (Testimony Michael Halliday, T. P.45) Exhibit 
No."Ill" was displayed upon the shelves of Appellants1 business, 
however the evidence is undisputed that it was not where children 
could see it; it was high on the upper shelves in order to 
prevent youngsters from having access to it. 
Q: Okay. For the purposes of the record, you're 
reaching your full arms length above your head. Is 
that a fair characterization? 
A: A pretty high man (inaudible), but another guy, 
Austin Lyman, a pretty high, tall person. They had 
to reach high to get it. My kids cannot get it. 
(Testimony, Kim Fai Chan, T. 106 L.25 P.107 L.5) 
Mr. Chan's testimony was clear that he relied 100% on the 
"R" rating of EXo"III". (T. 89, L.15-25) The Court will note 
upon inspection of this Exhibit that it is clearly rated "R" on 
the front cover. Mr. Chan also indicated that he relied upon the 
companies which distributed Exhibits "I" and "II" which 
represented the movies to be within the law and not X-rated, but 
because of their adult nature kept them under the counter away 
from minors and children. (T. 78, 79, 80). He testified 
customers must be over 21 to receive these materials. (T. 81, 
L.19-25) . 
D. Prosecutor Testifies 
Because of the unusual circumstance of the prosecutor 
taking the witness stand, over counsel's objections, Mr. Halls' 
proffer and testimony regarding his conversations with Mr. Chan 
are appended hereto as Exhibit "A" and select portions of Mr. 
Chan's direct and cross-examination by Mr. Hall are appended as 
Exhibit "B". Also appended are portions of Mr. Hall's closing 
argument consisting of certain exchanges with the Court which are 
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important to Appellant's claim of error regarding the prosecutor 




ALLOWING THE PROSECUTOR TO 
TESTIFY AS TO CRITICAL ELEMENTS 
OF THE CASE WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
Mr. Halls' roles as witness and prosecutor became totally 
confused and mixed and the Court as trier of fact could not help 
and was almost compelled to place greater weight upon the 
testimony of Mr. Halls than any other witness, and certainly the 
Defendant Kim Fai Chan, regarding whom all of Mr. Halls' 
testimony was directed. 
If the Court believed the materials Exhibits "I", "II", and 
"III", themselves to be obscene within the meaning of the 
ordinance, its only alternative was to find the Chans guilty upon 
the testimony of Mr. Halls. Because of this assertion Appellants 
request that this Court become familiar with the record as a 
whole, which is brief. Where First Amendment rights are involved 
Courts are obliged to make an independent and careful examination 
of the record. Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central 
School Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, (C.A.N.Y. 1979) cert, den., 444 U.S. 
1081, 100 S.Ct. 1034, 62 L.Ed.2d 765, on rem. 505 F.Supp. 102. 
A. General Rule - Competent Witness 
The general rule in litigation is that it is ordinarily 
inappropriate for an attorney to testify on behalf of his client 
and if the attorney learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer 
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in his firm ought to be called as a witness on behalf of his 
client, the attorney or his firm must decide whether to serve 
either as advocate or as witnesses in the case, based upon the 
rules of professional responsibility. Universal Athletic Sales 
Co. v, American Gym, etc a, 546 F.2d 530 (3rd Cir. 1976). The 
lawyer is generally recognized to be competent to testify, 
however, he should not do so unless he intends either to 
immediately thereafter withdraw, or unless there is evidence of a 
compelling "exceptional circumstance" which would work a 
"substantial hardship" upon the client. Absent special 
circumstances, the decision of whether to allow the attorney to 
testify is generally considered to be within the sound discretion 
of the Trial Court, as well as the decision to require the 
attorney to withdraw from the case. See 9 ALR Fed. 500, Attorney 
as Witness for Client in Federal Case; see also State v. 
Williams, 656 P.2d 450, (Utah 1982). 
B. Clear Ethical Violation 
That the practice, unless exigent circumstances attend, is 
unethical is beyond question. See Disciplinary Rule 5-101 and 
102, appended hereto. Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of 
the Utah State Bar, 1936, as amended, 1985. 
Where, as in the case at hand, the prosecutor trying a 
criminal case, and absent any extraordinary or compelling reason, 
takes the witness stand, not in rebuttal, but in his own case in 
chief, and testifies to key elements of the alleged offense, 
specifically the Defendant's knowledge, duty and state of mind it 
has been held not only to be an impropriety in the extreme, but 
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an abuse of the Trial Court's discretion and reversible error. 
See generally, 54 ALR 3d 100 Sections 2, 4 and 5; U.S. v. 
Robinson, 32 F.2d 505 (8th Cir., 1929); U.S. v. Torres, 503 F.2d 
1120 (2nd Cir., 1974); State v. McCuiston, 88 N.M. 94, 537 P.2d 
702 (1975); People v. Spencer, 512 P.2d 260, (Colo. 1973); State 
v. Hayes, 473 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. 1971); Frank v. State, a 35 N.W.2d 
816, (Neb. 1949); Pease v. District Court, 708 P.2d 800,(Colo. 
1985). 
C. Trial Court Error 
The Court's ruling of December 15, 1987, that there was 
"other substantial evidence of Kim Fai Chan's actual or 
constructive knowledge of the contents of the video tapes", is 
curious (R. 139). It would be difficult to point to other 
competent evidence of such knowledge absent Mr. Halls' testimony. 
It is further curious for the Court to rule that under the 
circumstances no "impropriety" occurred. The Trial Court states 
as follows: 
That the practice of a prosecuting attorney acting as 
such and also as a witness against the Defendant is not 
to be preferred but in this case where the prosecutor 
is the only prosecutor for the city and was the only 
witness with knowledge of the conversation it was not 
an abuse of discretion for the Court to allow the 
testimony (R.139). 
First, the ruling is dehors the record. There is no testimony 
from Mr. Halls or otherwise, that Mr. Halls was the "only 
prosecutor for the city". It certainly was not a matter 
judicially noticed in a manner which would afford defense counsel 
an opportunity to be heard as contemplated by Rule 201 U.R.E. 
Secondly, the ruling is believed incorrect. At the time of 
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trial, Mr. Halls had been elected San Juan County Attorney, and 
certainly another attorney could have been found to try the case 
for Blanding City. Third, defense counsel had absolutely no 
notice that Mr. Halls would testify and was totally surprised 
when he did. In answer to Defendants' discovery request, in his 
November 6, 1986, letter Mr. Halls indicated that his witnesses 
would be Michael Dayzie, Tim Austin and Mike Halliday. Those 
were the witnesses in Justice Court and no indication to the 
contrary was ever made. See Exhibit "D", letter from Craig 
Halls, November 6, 1986, Answer to Appellants Discovery Request 
as to which witnesses would be called to testify, paragraph 5. 
In U.S. v. Torres, 503 F.2d 1120, supra, at 1126 the Court 
stated that it was "erroneous to permit (the prosecutor) to 
testify " citing U.S. v. Alu, 246 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1957): 
"lawyers representing litigants should not be called as witnesses 
if such testimony can be avoided consonant with the end of 
obtaining justice. . . the Court below was well aware of the 
problems that the government was engendering for itself and 
indicated that it was up to the government whether it wished to 
take the risk of infecting the record with error. . ." 
In State v. McCuistion, supra, the State called the 
prosecutor as a rebuttal witness. He then testified about a 
conversation he had had with the Defendant. The statements were 
critical to the State's case. The Court was terse in its 
holding: 
The Assistant District Attorney argued his 
own credibility to the jury. This denied the 
Defendant a fair trial. 
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In reversing a perjury conviction in People v. Spencer, 
supra/ the Colorado Supreme Court, stating it to be 
"inconceivable" that the jury did not take into account that the 
prosecutor was convinced that the Defendant had committed 
perjury, found reversible error because he "had thrown his own 
weight into the scales against the Defendant." 
In State v. Hayes, 473 S.W.2d 688, supra, the Supreme Court 
of Missouri reversed a murder conviction stating at 691: 
A prosecuting attorney is not incompetent to 
be a witness and the Trial Court may exercise 
discretion in determining to what extent and 
to what matters he may be permitted to 
testify. However, the general and uniform 
rule is that the right of a prosecutor to 
testify in a criminal case "is strictly 
limited to those instances where his 
testimony is made necessary by the peculiar 
and unusual circumstances of the case. Even 
then, his functions as a prosecutor and as a 
witness should be disassociated. If he is 
aware, prior to trial, that he will be a 
necessary witness, or if he discovers this 
fact during the course of trial, he should 
withdraw and have other counsel try to the 
case. (Numerous citations omitted). . . As a 
public official "in whom the public has 
reposed confidence, his evidence is 
ordinarily given greater weight than that of 
an ordinary witness, and the natural tendency 
is for the Defendant to question the fairness 
of a trial when the prosecutor becomes a 
witness for the State. Therefore, he should, 
when that becomes necessary, so conduct 
himself as to foster and demonstrate the fact 
that he is not actively participating as a 
prosecutor but only as a witness, truthfully 
and impartially giving competent testimony. 
A significant impairment of First Amendment rights such as 
involved in this case must survive exacting scrutiny. Elrod v. 
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). 
Appellants assert that upon a review of the record as a whole 
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with "exacting scrutiny", the Court will be convinced that is 
"inconceivable" that the trier of fact did not take into account 
that the prosecutor was convinced of the Chans1 guilt and "had 
thrown his own weight into the scales" against the Defendants. 
People v. Spencer, supra. 
The prosecutor's testimony was absolutely critical to a 
conviction of Mr. Chan and the circumstances warrant reversal and 
a new trial. Mr. Hall's closing argument consisted to a 
significant extent of discussion with the Court which was 
testimonial in nature. He clearly argued his own credibility and 
Defendant's were denied a fair trial as a result. 
D. Prior Restraint - Immunity - Suppression 
Mr. Halls actions in and of themselves, to which he 
testified, constituted censorship of a most egregious variety. 
See Exhibit "A", "B", and "C". The invidious system of prior 
restraint imposed by Mr. Halls, amounting to a conditional grant 
of immunity should not be sanctioned by this Court. See Council 
for Periodical Distributors Ass'n. v. Evans, 642 F.Supp. 552 
(M.D. Ala 1986). As victims of this illegal prior restraint 
Appellants should be entitled to a new trial wherein Mr. Hall's 
testimony is suppressed in order to achieve a measure of 
prevention of this conduct in the future. 
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POINT II 
THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF 
"KNOWINGLY" INCORPORATED INTO BLANDING CITY 
ORDINANCE 13-120413 C IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
VAGUE, OVERBROAD AND INDEFINITE. 
A. To Review or Not To Review 
Kim Fai Chan was convicted only of Count II of the 
information, (R.116) alleging distribution of the tape 
"Confessions Of A Young American Housewife" on June 13, 1987. 
Mr. Chan testified that he had never seen or reviewed the 
video. Again the question of the weight of Mr. Hall's 
credibility comes into play. Ignoring that fact, however, for 
the purpose of this point, note the following exchange: 
Q: You indicated to him (Mr. Halls) that you would 
review the R-rated movies? 
A: No, Never. 
Q: This movie, "Confessions of an American Housewife", 
is this one that you viewed prior to June 13th? 
A: No. This has a rated "R" on it. I have job at that 
time. There's a rated "R" symbol on that box. 
(T. 89 L.15-22) 
B. Does Knowingly Mean Knowingly 
The ordinance indicates that in order to be convicted of the 
crime of "distributing pornography", inter alia, that the 
distribution occur "knowingly". That particular word is defined 
for use solely in the context of the framework set forth in Part 
12 of Title 76 Chapter 10, dealing with pornographic and obscene 
materials. This is the framework which must apply to the 
Blanding City Ordinance if its ordinance is to be a proper 
Constitutional exercise of municipal authority. Nasfell v. Ogden, 
249 P.2d 507 (Utah 1952). 
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The definition goes beyond the customary definition of 
"knowingly" embodied generally within Chapter two of the Criminal 
Code, Principles of Criminal Responsibility, 76-2-103(2) U.C.A. 
A special "pornography" definition of "knowingly" is separately 
stated: 
(4) "Knowingly" means an awareness, whether actual or 
constructive of the character of material or of a 
performance. A person has constructive knowledge if a 
reasonable inspection or observation under the 
circumstances would have disclosed the nature of the 
subject matter and if a failure to inspect or observe 
is either for the purpose of avoiding disclosure or is 
criminally negligent. 76-10-1201 U.C.A. 
This special definition leaves much to the imagination. What 
is a video tape lessor or vendor supposed to do in order to 
satisfy the requirement of a "reasonable inspection or 
observation under the circumstances"? If the purveyor reads the 
label of a movie rated "R", is that not a "reasonable 
inspection"? Why does that inspection not create a reasonable 
presumption that the materials contained within are appropriate 
for adult consumption? Must the lessor or vendor preview every 
"R" rated tape? Is that not a "prior restraint"? 
C. Objective Standards - Vagueness 
Since the statute sets forth no known objective standard 
against which to test and measure the "reasonableness of the 
inspection", the statute is vague as applied. "No one at peril 
of life, liberty or property may be required to speculate as to 
the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed 
of what the State commands and forbids." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 
306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). 
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Quoting from Connally v. General Construction Company, 269 
U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322, the Utah Supreme Court 
has stated that "a statute which either forbids or requires the 
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application violates the first essentials of due process of law. 
State v. Packard, 250 P.2d 561, 563, (Utah 1953). The Court 
further explained, 
...there is no disagreement among the Courts that where 
a rule is set up, the violation of which subjects one 
to criminal punishment, the restrictions upon conduct 
should be described with sufficient certainty, so that 
persons of ordinary intelligence, desiring to obey the 
law, may know how to govern themselves in conformity 
with it and that no one should be compelled at the 
peril of life, liberty or property, to speculate as to 
the meaning of penal statutes. 
Concerning the question of uncertainty or vagueness of 
statues, the authorities seem to be in accord that the 
test a statute must meet to be valid is: It must be 
sufficiently definite (a) to inform persons of ordinary 
intelligence, who would be law abiding, what their 
conduct must be to conform to its requirements; (b) to 
advise a defendant accused of violating it just what 
constitutes the offense with which he is charged, and 
(c) to be susceptible of uniform interpretation and 
application by those charged with the responsibility of 
applying and enforcing it. Packard, 250 P.2d at 564. 
Other Utah cases embracing these principles are Greaves v. 
State, 528 P.2d 805, 807 (1974); State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 1182, 
1883 (1981); and State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986). 
See also Papachriston v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 
S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 
408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); Smith v. 
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L. Ed.2d 605 (1973); See 
also U.S. v. Howard, 655 F.Supp. 392, 398, 399 (N.D. Ga. 1987) 
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The fundamental problem in the case before the Court i s the 
fo l lowing: 
...where a rule exacting punishment is made to depend 
on a test or matters as to which there may be an honest 
difference of opinion, it is too indefinite and 
uncertain to be enforced.... C.J.S., Criminal Law § 
24(2) pps 69, 70. 
As stated in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 
uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to steer 
far wider of the unlawful zone than if the boundaries 
of the forbidden areas were clearly marked. 33 L.Ed.2d 
at 228 (Citations omitted). 
Reasonable persons could perhaps differ in their opinion as 
to whether Mr. or Mrs. Chan made a "reasonable inspection". In 
this particular context that terminology invites speculation. 
The chilling effect of affirming the Trial Court's opinion that 
the Chans failed to make a reasonable inspection would be 
devastating to First Amendment freedoms and the ideal of 
uninhibited free flow of ideas in the market place of discussion 
in the area of this particular media, i.e., video tape movies. 
Appellants assert that the definition is overbroad and void 
on its face, because there is no limiting construction which 
could save the statute without judicially rewriting it. See 
Community Television v. Wilkinson, 611 F.Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 
1985), aff'd 800 F.2d 989; Home Box Office Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 
F.Supp. 986 (1982). Furthermore it penalizes the viewer, 
consumers of the media, whose rights are paramount. See Red Lion 
Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 89 S.Ct. 1794, L.Ed.2d 
(1969). 
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It is well to recall Chief Justice Warren's remarks in his 
concurring opinion in U.S. v. Roth,, ante: 
The line dividing the salacious or pornographic from 
literature or science is not straight and unwavering* 
Present laws depend largely upon the effect that these 
materials have on those who receive them. ...but there 
is more to these cases. It is not the book that is on 
trial; it is a person. The conduct of the Defendant is 
the central issue, not the obscenity of a book or 
picture. Roth, 1 L.Ed2d 1498, at 1513. 
Mr. and Mrs. Chan did all that could reasonably have been 
anticipated of them. To hold them to a higher standard is 
violative of their due process rights. Even if they did not do 
all they should have, the statute is no less vague and should be 
declared unconstitutional. 
POINT III 
THE MATERIALS ARE NOT 
CONSTITUTIONALLY UNPROTECTED OBSCENITY 
None of the Exhibits "I", "11" or "III" are "hardcore 
obscenity" as required for a successful pornography prosecution. 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 7 L.Ed 2d 419 
(1983), reh. den. 414 U.S. 881, 94 S.Ct. 26, 38 L.Ed 2d 128. 
The Utah Statute and Blanding City Ordinance essentially parrot 
the requirements set forth in Miller v. California, ante; see 
State v. Haig, 578 P.2d 837 (Utah 1978). 
A. Independent Appellate Review 
In order to arrive at the determination of whether the 
materials are constitutionally unprotected obscenity the scope of 
this Court's review is global. 
...Where the trier of facts has determined the question 
of obscenity in the context of constitutional 
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guaranties of freedom of speech and press, an Appellate 
Court is not bound by the conclusions of the Lower 
Courts or of juries but will re-examine the evidential 
basis on which those conclusions are founded. This 
rule applies to findings in the Lower Federal Courts as 
well as to findings of State Courts.... 50 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Lewdness, Indecency, Etc., § 42 Appellate Review, 
scope. P.495. 
In other words, this Court must review the tapes and make 
independent determination whether the materials are entitled to 
constitutional protection or are "hardcore". See for example 
Haldeman v. U.S., 340 F.2d 59 (10 Cir. 1965), holding sexually 
explicit materials including nudity not to be obscene, wherein 
the Court observes that "what is obscene and beyond the scope of 
constitutional protection is ultimately for the Courts to 
determine as a matter of law". 340 F.2d at 61. As stated by the 
United States Supreme Court: 
Hence, we reaffirm the principle that in "obscenity" 
cases as in all others involving rights derived from 
the First Amendment guarantees of free expression, this 
Court cannot avoid making an independent Consitutional 
Judgment on the facts of the case as to whether the 
material involved is constitutionally protected. 
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, at 190, 84 S.Ct. 1676 
at 1679 (1964). 
B. Sight Test 
After this Court has reviewed the materials it must make the 
requisite determinations set forth in Miller v. California, ante; 
and 76-101202 U.C.A. However, the answer still comes down to the 
oft quoted "I know it when I see it" test first posited by 
Justice Potter Stewart in his concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. 
Ohio, supra, 378 U.S. at 197, 84 S.Ct. at 1683: 
I have reached the conclusion, which I think is 
confirmed at least by negative implication in the 
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Court's decisions since Roth and Alberts, that under 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments criminal laws in 
this area are constitutionally limited to hard-core 
pornography. I shall not today attempt further to 
define the kinds of material I understand to be 
embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps 
I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I 
know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved 
in this case is not that. 
On the same day he concurred in A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 
378 U.S. 205, at 214, 84 S.Ct. 1752, 12 L.Ed2d 809 (1964), that 
the books were not "hard core" pornography and therefore 
"...Kansas could not by any procedure constitutionally suppress 
them...." 
C. Central Question - Is It "Hardcore" 
This is the test which has been adopted in the United States 
and in Utah. See Justice Maughn's concurring opinion in State v. 
Haig, supra; and Justice Burger's decision in Miller v. 
California, supra. As Justice Renquist stated in Hamling v. 
U.S., 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974), quoting 
first from U.S. v 12 200 ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 37, 93 
S.Ct. 2665, L.Ed.2d 500 (1973). 
"We further note that, while we must leave to State 
Courts the construction of state legislation, we do 
have a duty to authoritatively construe Federal 
statutes where a serious doubt of constitutionality is 
raised and "a construction of the statute is fairly 
possible by which the question may be avoided." 
United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 
363, 369 28 L.Ed. 2d 822, 91 S.Ct. 1400 (1971) (opinion 
of White, J.) quoting from Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 
22, 62, 76 L.Ed. 598, 52 S.Ct. 285 (1932). If and when 
such a serious doubt is raised as to the vagueness of 
the words obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent, 
or immoral as used to describe regulated material in 19 
U.S.C. § 1305(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 1462 19 U.S.C.S. § 
1305(a) and 18 U.S.C.S. § 1462, see United States v. 
Orito, 413 U.S. at 140 n 1, 37 L.Ed.2d 513, we are 
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prepared to construe such terms as limiting regulated 
material to patently offensive representations or 
descriptions of that specific hard core sexual conduct 
given as examples in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 
25, 37 L.Ed.2d 419. See United States v. Thirty-seven 
Photographs, supra at 369-374, 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (opinion 
of White, J.). Of course, Congress could always define 
other specific hard core "conduct." 413 U.S. at 130 n 
7, 37 L.Ed.2d 500. 
Miller undertook to set forth examples of the types of 
material which a statute might proscribe as portraying 
sexual conduct in a patently sexual conduct in a 
patently offensive way, 413 U.S. at 25-26, 37 L.Ed.2d 
419, and went on to say that no one could be prosecuted 
for the "sale or exposure of obscene materials unless 
these materials depict or describe patently offensive 
hard core sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
regulating state law, as written or construed." Id., 
at 27, 37 L.Ed.2d 419. As noted above, we indicated in 
United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, supra, at 
130 n 7, 37 L.Ed. 2d 500, that we were prepared to 
construe the generic terms in 18 U.S.C. § 1462, 18 
U.SoC.S. § 1462 to be limited to the sort of "patently 
offensive representation or description of the specific 
hard core sexual conduct given as examples in Miller v. 
California." Hamling v. U.S., 41 L.Ed.2d at 618 
(Emphasis Supplied). 
Consequently, one must in an overall consideration of the 
law make the determination whether the materials, Exhibits "I", 
"II", and "III", alleged to be obscene are so in such a fashion 
that one must characterize them as "hard core". Appellants 
submit that some might deem these Exhibits to be ribald classics. 
Certainly, however, none could be said to be "hard core" 
pornography. There are no genitals observed, no penetration 
visible, no vivid, lurid gynecological and other such details of 
the type one normally associates with "hard core" pornography. 
There is much left to the imagination. 
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P. Sex Is Not Obscenity 
The Trial Court felt that depictions of sex acts 
necessarily rendered these works obscene. That determination is 
incorrect. The line between a video version of "Tropic of 
Cancer", analogous to Exhibit "III", "Confessions Of A Young 
American Housewife", puerile though it may be, and the unrelieved 
smut and filth of the "hardcore" "Deep Throat" or "Behind the 
Green Door", is not a difficult one to draw. Exhibit III is 
simply not "hardcore obscenity". Even less so are Exhibits "I", 
"II". 
The determination is not whether the material is acceptable 
to oneself. The critical question is whether it is material which 
one will tolerate for viewing by someone else. Of the latter 
examples, e.g., "Deep Throat" one might reasonably conclude that 
no one in the community should be allowed to observe. Exhibits 
"I", "II", and "III", however, are not so patently offensive or 
"hardcore" that the right of censorship should be allowed. They 
have serious, humorous, and legitimate entertainment value. To 
some they might be deemed quite artful. 
In an atmosphere of repression, as is argued to exist in 
Utah, the course of wisdom may well be to give a freeing hand to 
those materials and ideas which serve as a release valve by which 
to allow the pressure to escape in innocuous and harmless 
fashion. The viewing of the materials before the Court in this 
case may be just such a necessary palliative. The United States 
Supreme Court has stated its view in the following fashion: 
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Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life, 
has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest 
to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital 
problems of human interest and public concern. As to 
all such problems, this Court said in Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 310 U.So 88, 101, 102, 84 L.Ed. 1093, 1102, 60 
S.Ct. 736: "The freedom of speech and of the press 
guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least 
the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all 
matters of public concern without previous restraint or 
fear of subsequent punishment. The exigencies of the 
colonial period and the efforts to secure freedom from 
oppressive administration developed a broadened 
conception of these liberties as adequate to supply the 
public need for information and education with respect 
to the significant issues of the times.... Freedom of 
discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function 
in this nation, must embrace all issues about which 
information is needed or appropriate to enable the 
members of society to cope with the exigencies for 
their period." Roth v. U.S., 354 U.Sc 476, 1 L.Ed.2d 
1498 at 1509, 77 S.Ct. 1304 (1957)* (Emphasis added.) 
"Sex and obscenity are not synonymous." Roth at 1509. The fact 
that these materials are decidedly sexual in nature does not 
abrogate all Constitutional protection. Sex is a "significant 
issue of the times". 
E. Average Person - Community Standards 
General Discussion 
Judgment regarding "contemporary community standards", 
whatever that phrase means, must be made in the context of the 
"average person's" opinion. The "average person" is, of course, 
not synonymous with the "reasonable person". The "average 
person" takes in all extremes of society as well as those from 
the middle of the road, both reasonable, unreasonable, perverse 
and not so perverse. The material's effect must neither be 
judged on the basis of a particularly sensitive nor insensitive 
group or person* See Hamling v. U.S., supra, at 41 L.£do2d 615. 
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According to the testimony of Mr, Laws, "numerous dozens" of 
persons found these types of videos to be to their taste, (T.22, 
L.l-4; T.29, L.6-14) so one might conclude that they are well 
within what the "average person" applying "contemporary community 
standards" finds acceptable in Blanding and parts thereabout, the 
"vicinage". 
This "average person" standard also applies to the questions 
of prurient interest and patent offensiveness, the first and 
second prongs of the Miller test. 
F. Reasonable Person 
As to the question, however, of whether the work, taken as a 
whole, "has serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value, " however, the thoughts of the "average person" or 
"community standard" are not relevant. These values are held not 
to vary from community to community. The "reasonable person" 
standard is used to determine the third prong of the Miller test. 
Pope v. Illinois, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987). 
G. Pandering 
As suggested in Miller v. California, the question of 
pandering, of "thrusting" sexually explicit materials by 
"aggressive sales tactics" upon recipients having no desire to 
receive them is also relevant to the obscenity inquiry: 
...States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting 
discrimination or - exhibition of obscene material when 
the mode of discrimination carries with it a 
significant danger of offending the sensibilities of 
unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles. 
Miller at 37 L.Ed.2d 427. 
Obviously from a review of the record this issue presents no 
problem in this case. Pandering or risk of exposure to minors or 
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the otherwise unwilling is completely anathema to the state of 
the evidence before this Court. 
H. The Statute - The Standards 
The questions before this Court under Miller and the 
ordinance are threefold: 
(1). Does the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards, find that, taken as a whole, the 
material appeals to prurient interest in sex; 
(2). Is it patently offensive in the description or 
depiction of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, 
sado-masochistic abuse, or excretion; and 
(3). Taken as a whole must a reasonable person find 
that it does not have serious literary, artistic, political 
or scientific value. 
The Respondent cannot convince this Court, that the "average 
person" applying "contemporary community standards" would agree 
that these materials appeal to a prurient interest in sex; nor 
that a reasonable person applying objective standards must find 
that it lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific 
value. Most important it cannot demonstrate that this material 
is "patently offensive" in its depictions of sex and nudity. The 
ideas conjured, the philosophies espoused, the concepts 
engendered, may well be offensive and loathsome in the extreme. 
But the First Amendment exists to protect such ideas and concepts 
most of all. The depictions themselves, are vague, brief, non-
explicit, and relatively innocuous. The depictions are not 
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"patently offensive". This is simply not "hard core" pornography 
as contemplated by the authorities: 
Under the holdings announced todayy no one will be 
subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of 
obscene materials unless these materials depict or 
describe patently offensive "hard core" sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the regulating state law, as 
written or construed. Miller v. Californiaf 37 L.Ed.2d 
at 432. (Emphasis added) 
CONCLUSION 
This prosecution should be remanded with directions for the 
Trial Court to enter a Judgment of Dismissal on all counts. 
DATED this day of June, 1988. 
Herschel Bullen 
McDonald and Bullen 
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And you now wish to change your testimony? 
There's -- When we went over with the Search 
we got 20-plus tapes. 
Just answer my question. 
Well, I'm trying to, sir. 
Do you want to change your testimony? 
No, sir. 
Did you get four tapes from Mr. Dayzie on May 
I'm uncertain as to whether we got four or two. 












I know that we got those two for sure. 
Do you recall his testimony at trial? 
No, I don't. 
And do you recall that he testified that he got-H 
purchased four? 
I don't recall that. 
Until I confronted him with a receipt? 
I don't recall that. 
MR. BULLEN: I have nothing further. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
MR. HALLS: Nothing further. Your Honor, | 
time I'm not sure how this is going to work out, 
like to call myself as a witness. 
6 1 J 
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MR. BULLEN: That's a bit unusual, Mr. Halls. 
THE COURT: Are you going to examine your-
self? 
MR. HALLS: Ifm going to proffer some testi-
mony and let you cross-examine me. 
THE COURT: Why don't you make a proffer 
of what your testimony is going to be, Mr. Halls, and we'll 
see what kind of an objection counsel might have. 
MR. HALLS: Your Honor, after these initial 
two movies were confiscated by the police, Mr. Kim Fai Chan 
came to my office and we had a discussion for approximately 
a half an hour with regard to what he would do in policing 
himself and these types of movies. I would testify with 
regard to those conversations. Essentially my conversations 
with Mr. Chan in.regard to whether we were going to bring 
any charges on these movies and so on. 
THE COURT: Is that going to be an issue? 
MR. BULLEN: Well, I don't think it has any 
relevance. 
MR. HALLS: There's a part of that, Your 
Honor, that indicates -- where Mr. Chan indicated to me that 
he viewed all of these non-rated movies personally. He also 
assured me that he would view any movies in the future per-
sonally to make sure that they were all fit for viewing. 
I think that goes to his scienter, his knowledge, his 
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1 constructive knowledge of whether or not he was put on know 
2 ledge that that's something that he should do. 
3 THE COURT: This was after these first two 
4 were confiscated; is that correct? 
5 MR- HALLS: Yes. 
6 THE COURT: Will your testimony be to the 
7 effect that he was going to do that with regard to these 
8 two or was he going to do this into the future? 
9 MR. HALLS: He would do that -- These movies 
10 had already been confiscated and expressed to him as being, 
11 along with two or three other movies that were confiscated 
12 by virtue of the Search Warrant, that these were not accept-
13 able movies. And he indicated that it had been his practicej 
14 to purchase non-rated movies, adult viewing movies, but that 
15 he previewed them all before he put them on the shelf to 
16 determine whether their content was objectionable or not. 
17 And he indicated to me that that was his practice and also 
18 that he would do that in the future to ensure that none of 
19 these movies would -- He also indicated that any movie --
20 and I think he named a couple of titles; one of the ones 
21 I remember was a Playboy movie that even if it were rated, 
22 if it had a suggestive cover, that he viewed those also to 
23 determine content. I think that is pertinent to his know-
24 ledge or his constructive knowledge of the contents of thes^ 
25 films and these types of films. 
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MR. BULLEN: I think it's extremely objectiofi 
able. At this point in time an attorney that's trying a 
3 j case, to put his own credibility and candor into issue befor£ 
4 the Court, I think it's down right unethical to do that. 
5 And it puts me in a very difficult position because I feel 
6 that Mr. Halls has made some misstatements to the Court pre-
7 viously about some conversations that he and I had, and I 
8 don't want to get into that ballgame with you. And I just 
9 think it's — For him not to have made arrangements for some 
10 body else to try this case so that he could go ahead and 
11 be a witness freely without an unfettered -- you know, with-
12 out any fear of running into this kind of problem, I think 
13 it's improper and objectionable. I understand the point 
14 that he's making, but I think it's improper for him to put 
15 himself in that position. 
16 MR. HALLS: Well, Your Honor, if I thought 
17 that this was improper or if I thought that this was mal-
18 practice, or if I thought that this was objectionable from 
19 that standpoint, I wouldn't propose to do it. I don't find 
20 anything unethical about what I propose to do. Mr. Kim Fai 
21 Chan came into my office with regard to his future activity 
22 and how he would police himself with regard to this very 
23 issue. Perhaps I should have gotten someone else to try 
24 the case, but I don't see anything unethical in me proffer-
25 ing testimony and giving Mr. Bullen an opportunity to reach 
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1 an understanding on how I feel about what I was told and 
2 what our conversation was. 
3 MR. BULLEN: I submit it. 
4 THE COURT: Step forward and be sworn, Mr. 
5 Halls. 
5 (Whereupon Craig C. Halls, 
being first duly sworn, testi 
7 fied as follows:) 
8 DIRECT STATEMENT 
9 BY MR. HALLS: 
10 In approximately May of 1986, the movies that are listed 
11 here as Exhibit No. 1 and Exhibit No. 2 were confiscated 
12 by the Police Department. And it came to my attention as 
13 City Attorney that they may be prosecuted. Mr. Kim Fai Chan] 
14 came to my office for the purpose of talking to me and 
15 essentially pleading with me to make a different arrangement 
16 than to prosecute. He made — Mr. Chan and myself were the 
17 only people in the office. He indicated to me at that time 
18 that these were adult viewing type movies; that he spent 
19 considerable time viewing these movies prior to putting them) 
20 on the shelf. And he indicated to me that the questionable-}" 
21 "questionable" is not the word -- he indicated to me that 
22 the covers that were suggestive, he also viewed those moviesj 
23 And based upon his assertions that he would preview 
24 all of these movies
 f I indicated to him that we would hold 
25 in abeyance the prosecution of these movies, provided he 
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1 didn't have any other problems. So we essentially told 
2 him that we would hold the movies -- I told him that we woul{5 
3 hold the movies, and if he didn't have any further problems 
4 with this type of material, that he was going to take care 
5 of himself, that we would not prosecute those. I indicated 
6 to him at the time that if he did have further problems, 
7 we would feel free to bring these movies back in and prosecujte 
8 on them. 
9 That's the reason why — 
10 MR. BULLEN: I'll object to what the reason 
11 is. 
12 DIRECT STATEMENT (Continued) We had no other problems| 
13 with it. I believe that was — 
14 MR. BULLEN: I'll object to anything but 
15 the substance of the conversation. 
16 DIRECT STATEMENT (Continued) That was approximately 
17 May 5th. The other movie came to our attention in June. 
18 THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Halls? 
19 MR. HALLS: No. 
20 THE COURT: Do you want to cross-examine? 
21 I MR. BULLEN: I have no cross. 
MR. HALLS: We have nothing further, Your 
23 I Honor. 
24 THE COURT: You're not going to offer the 
25 exhibits for me to watch? 
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1 MR. HALLS: Well, Your Honor, I think we ought 
2 to limit this to the problem; not to what his impression of 
3 what Mr. Laws might be trying to do or not do. Just have 
4 him explain. I don't think that's responsive to the questio|i. 
5 THE COURT: Can you kind of lead him along 
6 a little bit? 
7 MR. BULLEN: No, I can't. I'm going to with 
8 draw that question. I'll try to reapproach it at a later tijne 
9 Q (By Mr. Bullen) Let me ask you: Have you ever 
10 received an X-rated movie from any of the companies? 
11 A Yes, one time. 
12 Q And it had an actual "X" on the movie? 
13 A It did actually have an "X" on them. 
14 Q What did you -- What did you do with that movie? 
15 A And I didn't know that. It's usually that is 
16 impossible those available, so I saw it when I come home 
17 after work. And I saw it. I hurry up and call the company 
18 back and tell them about it. 
19 Q What company was that? 
20 A It's a Vicon in Salt Lake City. 
21 Q Um-hum. And what did you do with that tape? 
22 A And they also surprised. And then they asked 
23 me to send it back. 
24 Q All right. Did you send it back? 

































Is that they only one you've ever received? 
Yes. 
What was the name of that one? 
"The Story of Olga." 
Do you recall, Mr. Chan, a conversation that you 1 















Did you have a discussion with him with regard 
-- Before I forget, do you have some Playboy 
things like that come in from time to time? 
Yes. 
What are they rated? 
They are rated R, but they don't have any rating 1 
the copy at all (inaudible). No rating on the box 
Well, then how do you know they're rated R? What 
do you mean they're rated R? 
A I call up those companies and call up and talk 
to my dealer. And I say, What are — Are they rated X, 
Playboy?" 
is the one 
Salt Lake. 
there's no 
They say, "No, this is rated R." And at Vicon 
company in Salt Lake. It's the major company in 
They give me the information. And I said, "But 
rating on the box." They said, "They are rated 
R." And then I depend on that information. 
85 1 
j Q Was this after May 5th? 
2 A No. When I start business, that's what I under-
3 stand. 
4 Q Okay. 
5 A That what I understand. That is my policy on 
5 my business. 
7 Q All right. Did you have an understanding with 
g regard to these tapes? 
9 A Yes. They are unrated, and then I call up to 
10 them (inaudible), those companies that sold it to me. I 
11 say, "Are they X-rated?,f "They are not." They are unrated 
12 or not rated. There's a lot of movies. Not only these kind] 
13 It's a lot of movies is unrated, not rated. They could be 
14 any kind unrated, not rated. They are not X-rated. I say, 
15 "Are they legal?" I call up to Texas, their company. I 
16 forgot if it's Texas or Oklahoma, somewhere, that company. 
17 They say, "No, they are not X-rated." We have the same. 
18 X-rated movie are not allowed in Texas. They are not allowejd 
19 it --
20 Q Not allowed? Is that what you're saying? 
21 A Not allowed. 
22 Q As in Utah? 
23 A As in Utah. We have the same law as Utah. 
24 MR. HALLS: Your Honor — 
25 THE WITNESS: And you cannot get X-rated mo^ie, 
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1 MR. HALLS: Your Honor, I'll object and ask 
2 that that be stricken. I don't think that Mr. Chan knows 
3 whether Texas has the same law as Utah. 
4 MR. BULLEN: No, but it goes directly to 
5 his (inaudible). 
6 THE COURT: Well, I'll let it in. It's hear 
7 say, but --
8 MR. BULLEN: But it's not admitted for --
9 THE COURT: No. 
10 MR. BULLEN: (Inaudible) 
11 Q (By Mr. Bullen) Mr. Chan, let's go forward from 
12 May 5th a little bit. Do you recall having a conversation 
13 with Craig Halls? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q Do you recall having a discussion during that 
16 period with regard to what your practice was going to be 
17 in the future? 
18 A Yes. 
19 MR. HALLS: (Inaudible) leading. I want 
20 to hear what his testimony is. 
21 MR. BULLEN: Okay. All right. 
22 Q (By Mr. Bullen) If you will, remember the sub-
23 stance of that conversation and relate it to the Judge. 
24 A I, urn -- After the first time. Is it May that 
25 you're referring? 
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1 Q Yes. 
2 A April or May? 
3 Q May. 
4 A May, okay. The first time is May. And then I--
5 After that I went into Craig Halls!s office. We have a con-
6 versation about, urn, how is that movie? I want to find out 
7 the policy of the community — 
8 Q Just relate the conversation. What did you say? 
9 What did he say? 
10 A He -- I — He say or I say? 
11 Q Both. The conversation. Both. 
12 A He -- He — He said that he -- He say — Okay. 
13 In general, he said, urn -- you ask me to view -- it's not 
14 quoting, okay? It's too long ago. He ask me to view the 
15 unrated movie and not rated movie. And I -- I will to view 
16 the unrated and not rated movie as much as I can (inaudible) 
17 Q Well, I think you understand, but for the purpose) 
18 of the record, the word you're using, is it "view?" 
19 A View. V-i-e-w. 
20 Q All right. Is there anything further that he 
21 said? 
22 A He didn't say he would drop the chages. He 
23 didn't have any -- it's not agreement. I think that's all. 
24 He didn't say a lot of things. And he read up from a book 
25 say that the policy of the da, da, da, da. He just keep 
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reading it. I says, "Mr. Hall, I just come here to want 
to find out if they are not X-rated, they are rated, I call 
up the company. They are unrated, and I didn't know that 
4 j they -- I call up the company. I call up the company before 
5 I (inaudible) they are not X-rated." And I try to explain 
6 j to -- my situation to him. He keep reading a book from the 
City ordinance, something like that. But it is a long one. 
8 I I say, "I understand* Mr. Hall, I want -- I just want to 
9 know — I want to cooperate. You can drop the charges, okay 
10 I They are not X-rated, You can drop the charges. Then I 
will in the future — and will be responsible to unrated and 
not rated movie." And he didn't -- It's not our agreement 
13 I at all. He didn't drop the charges. He will look into it, 
14 I and he never got back to me (inaudible). 
Q You indicated to him that you would review the 
16 I R-rated movies? 
17 A No, never. 
18 Q This movie, "Confessions of an American Housewife] 
19 is this one that you viewed prior to June 13th? 
20 A No. This has a rated R on it. I have job at 
21 j that time. There's a rated R symbol on that box. I rely 
hundred percent on that rating on that box. 
23 I Q To your knowledge, has your wife ever seen any 
24 I of these movies? 
A She never seen that up to this moment. 
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1 A Urn, responsible? What dc you mean by responsible?! 
2 Q Who's responsible? Who decides if that goes on 
3 the shelf? 
4 A Of course, owner of the — of course, whoever is 
5 (inaudible) that is legal according to law put that on shelfj 
6 Q You really -- What you*re saying is you, as the 
7 owner, has the responsibility? 
8 A I think the owner has the (inaudible) whoever 
9 went in that store knows that that is legal and put it on 
10 the shelf• 
11 Q Yes-
12 A X-rated, I won't. 
13 Q And it's not the responsibility of the City policje 
14 men to come and look at all your movies to decide whether 
15 it violates the statute, is it? 
16 MR. BULLEN: Well, I'll object to it as 
17 assuming facts not in evidence. 
18 THE COURT: And I think it's argumentative, 
19 Mr. Halls. 
20 Q (By Mr. Halls) Do you recall a -- You've testi-
21 fied about a conversation that you had with me in my office,] 
22 and I've testified with regard to — briefly with regard 
23 to some of that. Do you remember when you came to my offied 
24 that you indicated to me — Do you remember giving — saying 
25 a comment that you viewed all of these non-rated movies 
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1 before you put them on there and you promised that you wouldj 
2 continue to do that in the future? You indicated that you 
3 stayed up late at night watching each of these, did you not?j 
4 A Your conversation is not that, Mr. Hall. Do you 
5 want me to rephrase it one more time? 
6 Q Well, I want you -- I want you to tell me whether] 
7 you remember what I just asked you. Do you remember tellingj 
8 me that? 
9 A I remember the other thing you said but not rememj-
10 ber what you just said, 
11 Q And do you remember that you wanted me to tell 
12 you what was pornographic or what was not, and that's why 
13 I read to you from the statute? 
14 A You told me — You told me — I want to go insidej 
15 to set — to settle with this (inaudible), Mr. Hall, that— 
16 That is legal. I call up the company before I rent it. 
17 Q I'm not --
18 A (Continued) — That's what I say. That's what 
19 I remember. And if I was you (inaudible) concern of the 
20 community of view, then I will rate it. I will view, v-i-e-|w, 
21 view that, those movies, unrated, not rated, in the future, 
22 but not rated R. I never promised to view all the rated 
23 R movie. It is impossible. 
24 Q Do you remember me telling you that you had the 
25 responsibility, as the owner, to censor your own movies? 
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j A I cannot recall you say that. I only recall--
2 you never give me agreement and you never give me any --
3 any -- You never give me any agreement on that. 
4 Q Do you remember --
5 A (Inaudible) that is different thing. 
6 Q Do you remember me telling you that I couldn't 
7 tell you what the requirements were and I read you the 
8 statute; that I couldn't tell you which movies were and whic^ i 
9 movies weren't, that that was up to you? 
JO A You are -- you are -- You are not telling me the 
11 time. You quoting from the City ordinance. The whole 
12 thing is so long I don't understand. 
13 Q I told you that that's the ordinance, that's the 
14 requirement, and you have to abide by this. I'm not going 
15 to come and look at your movies and determine which ones 
16 are and which ones aren't. 
17 MR. BULLEN: I don't know whether this is 
18 objectionable or not, considering the posture of these two 
19 people here. But I think it ought to stop at some point, 
20 Your Honor. 
21 Q (By Mr. Halls) Mr. Kim Fai, did you have the 
22 covers of these movies displayed? What is your policy with 
23 regard to displaying covers of these movies? 
24 A. Urn, you mean this time? 
25 Q I mean all your movies. 
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1 speaks for itself with regard to what it contains and whethe 
2 or not it is intended for some serious purpose or whether 
3 it's intended to excite and do these other things sexually. 
4 I don't think there can really be any question. And I don't] 
5 think we should muddy the waters by trying to determine 
6 whether there's a constitutional problem here. The statute 
7 that Blanding City is going under is the same statute the 
g State has used and the same statute that has essentially 
9 been upheld in State vs. Hague. Now, that's the constitu-
10 tional issue, and it's already been decided. So now that 
11 the -- The situation we have before the Court is to apply 
12 it. Applying that statute, is there a — Can these materialjs 
13 be found pornographic? Are they pornographic? That's 
14 entirely up to you. I thank you. 
15 THE COURT: Mr. Halls, before you sit down, 
16 let me ask you a couple of questions. Is it your position 
17 that the entrepreneur, then, cannot rely to any extent on 
18 the rating? 
19 MR. HALLS: It would be my position, Your 
20 Honor, that the entreprenuer is -- has a burden. He has 
21 the entire burden of determining what he puts on the shelf. 
22 There's no other way. Otherwise, we're going to go prose-
23 cute who put the rating on. 
24 THE COURT: Did you feel that when you dis-





made a grant of immunity to Mr. Chan so long as he monitored 
the films in the future? 
3 I MR- HALLS: No, I did not. In fact, what 
4 I indicated to him -- I indicated to him that on the two 
5 J movies -- Well, this is by way of testimony, I guess, Your 
Honor -- I indicated to him that on the two movies -- He 
was in my office for the purpose of trying to work --
g I THE COURT: Yes, I understand that. 
9 MR. HALLS: (Continued) - - a n essential 
10 J complaint that had been made against him. And what I indi-
cated to him was we would hold, essentially in abeyance, 
12 I and he agreed with me or told me that he would police himsel 
13 And we took no action, but we didn't say that we wouldn't. 
14 THE COURT: And then when this incident when] 
15 you found Exhibit No. 3 came to life, then you went back 
16 and reactivated the original proposition against both Mr. 
17 Chan and Mrs. Chan; is that — 
18 MR. HALLS: That's correct. 
19 THE COURT: That's essentially it. 
20 MR. HALLS: There was no discussion with 
21 regard to immunity or anything like that. We were just try-j 
22 ing to reach a kind of agreement that we could both live 
23 with and see if we couldn't handle the problem. 
24 THE COURT: Was there any discussion at tHatj-
25 on that occasion — and this may be improper, as far as 
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1 testimony is concerned - but do you remember anything indi-
2 cated about whether or not he was going to monitor R-rated? 
3 MR. HALLS: My testimony, and Mr. Chan's 
4 testimony, Your Honor, are somewhat different. It was m y — 
5 it is my recollection that when Mr. Chan came to talk to 
6 me, he indicated to me that he -- and this is what I believe 
7 I testified to -- he indicated to me that he already was 
8 viewing these movies. He did that by way of assurance to 
9 me that he was trying to handle the problem. So, the situa-
10 tion — 
jl THE COURT: I think that was your testimony. 
12 MR. HALLS: So the situation -- the situatiofi 
13 that sticks in my mind is that Mr. Chan indicated that he 
14 was already viewing the movies and that he would continue 
15 to view the movies. And it's my impression, now my recollec] 
16 tion, that that was both the adult rated movies, and he had 
17 I a number of other movies, rated R and other things; for 
instance, the Playboy movies and so forth. And he told me 
19 I that when they had suggestive covers, that he viewed them 
20 before he put them on the stand. I believe that was my 
21 j testimony, and he --
THE COURT: That was your testimony. 
23 I MR. HALLS: And his testimony was contrary. 
24 MR, BULLEN: That wasn't his testimony. It 
25 was his proffer, but it wasn't his testimony. He did proffd 
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1 that if there's any distinction that can be made there. 
2 MR. BULLEN: I have to object to this whole-] 
3 THE COURT: My notes indicate that (inaudible) 
4 Okay, Mr. Halls, that's all I have. Your objection is noted) 
5 for the record. 
6 Will the Defendants please rise? Mr, Kim Fai Chan, 
7 I find you guilty of the offense of Distributing Pornographij 
8 Materials on the charge due on June 15th. I find you not 
9 guilty of the charge on May the 5th. Defendant, Sook Wah 
10 Chan, I find you guilty of the charge of — charging you 
11 with Distribution of Pornographic Materials on May the 5th, 
12 1986. 
13 What do you say with regard to punishment or imposi-
14 tion of sentence, gentlemen? 
15 MR. BULLEN: Did I understand the Court 
16 correctly: you find Mr. Chan not guilty on May 5th? 
17 THE COURT: That's correct. 
18 MR. BULLEN: And Mrs. Chan guilty? 
19 THE COURT: Yes. I couldn't find that the 
20 State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that scienter 
21 knowledge -- element for Mr. Chan. I think he proved it 
22 for Mrs. Chan. I'm not willing to impute her knowledge to 
23 him, especially where there was a denial in the State's 
24 witness. Mr. Halliday indicated that when he approached Mr.l 
25 Chan, Mr. Chan claimed to have no knowledge of the materials. 
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1 MR. BULLEN: Well, I don't particularly want 
2 to come back. I don't know that I'm ready this minute to --| 
3 I don't want to have to come back from Salt Lake. 
4 THE COURT: Do you want some time to discuss] 
5 with your clients and/or Mr. Halls what punishment he's 
6 going to recommend and/or --
7 MR. BULLEN: What do you recommend, Mr. Halljs? 
8 MR. HALLS: Are you sentencing, Your Honor, 
9 under the City ordinance? I guess that is the case, isn't 
10 it — is it not? Originally in the other case I think he 
U was fined -- the fine was about $200.00, and there's a man-
12 datory jail sentence in that statute. As far as that goes, 
13 we don't have any -- I think it's like seven days. And, 
14 I don't know how — whether really I have the authority to 
15 waive a mandatory sentence. We would definitely — At this 
16 point I don't feel that the City would be served by taking 
17 him away from — or maybe they can serve that on weekends, 
18 or maybe we could do part public service, or something like 
19 that. 
20 MR. BULLEN: I would suggest that it could 
21 be done by confinement at home. 
22 MR. HALLS: Well --
23 THE COURT: May I see that portion of the ccjde? 
24 MR. HALLS: It would be my position, Your 
25 Honor, that the City of Blanding would recommend whatever 
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November 6, 1986 
Herschel Bullen 
Attorney for Defendant 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re; Discovery of Plaintiff's Case 
Dear Herschel 
In accordance with your request for discovery of our 
records with regard to the Chin and Chan matters I have enclosed 
various documents and reports. The one glaring omission to this 
information is the Statement of Mike Daisy. Our Chief of Police 
is on two weeks vacation in Kansas and has the statement as part 
of his file. I will get it to you as soon as it is available to 
me. 
Since I have not heard from you on the date for the 
trial I have set it for November 25th beginning at 10:00 a.m. at 
the Blanding City Offices. If you have any Voir Dire questions 
or wish to submit jury instructions please do so one week in 
advance of the trial. 
In answering your requests: 
1. None 
2. There is no record in Blanding City other than the 
current charges that I am aware of. 
3. Copies of the covers of the seized movies are 
enclosed 
4. A. None 
B. None 
C. This question is left to local standards as 
determined by the jury 
D. See C. above 
E. Movies not Rated 
F. Mr. Kim Fai Chan was present in my office after 
The confiscation of the movies and indicated 
that he had viewed the movies contained in Count 
G. Unknown 
H. None 
I. Attorney Steven Boos viewed "Confessions of a 
Normal American Housewife" and made some of 
these types of comments. 
J. None 
5. Michael Dayzie 
168 N. 400 W. Box 175 
Blanding, Utah 84511 
Tom Austin 
142 N. 200 E. (11-4) 
Blanding, Utah 84511 
Mike Halliday 
242 S. 200 W. (65-1) 
Blanding, Utah 84511 
6. A statement was given to the local radio station by 
the police Chief after confiscation of the material. 
The Manager of the station contacted me before running 
the spot as news and I believe after my conversation 
did not run the piece. I have not seen the text of the 
material. I am aware that Mr. Chan went to the radio 
station and got a copy of the statement. 
I believe this letter will take care of the concerns you 
expressed in your motion. If you have any questions please 
immediately advise. 
Sin 
